Recently, Tang et al. ͓Phys Lett. A 318, 388 ͑2003͔͒ proposed a spatiotemporal cryptosystem based on one-way coupled map lattices. They claim that it has high security, fast encryption speed, and short synchronization transient. This work proves that this scheme has some security weaknesses. Indeed, we propose an attack which the system cannot withstand. © 2007 American Institute of Physics. ͓DOI: 10.1063/1.2756297͔ This paper presents an attack on a cryptosystem designed by using a spatiotemporal chaotic system. It is important to show if a cryptosystem is secure or not. The attack operates like the chosen plaintext attack: we choose a plaintext string and construct the corresponding ciphertext to determine the key that was used, or to recover any ciphertext without using the key. To make the attack more powerful, we use two drawbacks in the design of the cryptosystem: First, the generation of the ciphertext is independent of its length. Second, the weakness of encryption operation, which uses a modular one. By one pair of plaintext/ciphertext, we can guess other 2 − 1 pairs. The attack is rapid and shows that the cryptosystem is insecure and not suitable for practical use.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern telecommunication networks, and especially the Internet and mobile-phone networks, have tremendously extended the limits and possibilities of communications and information transmissions. Associated with this rapid development is a growing demand of cryptographic techniques, which has spurred a great deal of intensive research activities in the study of cryptography.
1,2
The appeal of using chaos is mainly due to its random behavior, sensitivity to initial conditions, and parameter settings, which fulfill the classic Shannon requirements of confusion and diffusion. There exist two main approaches of designing chaosbased cryptosystems: analog and digital.
Most analog chaos-based cryptosystems are secure communication schemes designed for noisy channels, based on the technique of chaos synchronization.
4 Chaos synchronization is a technique developed in the 1990s. Roughly speaking, it means that two chaotic systems can synchronize with each other under the driving of one or more scalar signals, which are generally sent from one system to another. In chaos-synchronization-based cryptosystems, the information can be transmitted by one or more chaotic signals in a number of ways, including ͑but not limited to͒ the following: chaotic masking, 5-8 chaotic modulation, 9-11 and chaotic shift keying.
12,13
Digital chaos-based cryptosystems ͑also called digital chaotic ciphers͒, on the other hand, are designed for digital computers, where one or more chaotic maps are implemented in finite computing precision to encrypt the plain message in a number of ways. The two more recent chaotic cryptosystems are the Baptista-type 14-20 and the Alvareztype cryptosystems. 21, 22 Both schemes have shown security flaws.
23-26
On the other hand, spatiotemporal chaotic systems [27] [28] [29] have been investigated in secure communications as an alternative to low-dimensional ones.
14-22 Indeed, such hyperchaotic systems are characterized by a great number of positive Lyapunov exponents and are assumed more complex in dynamics. In particular, Tang et al. have proposed in Ref. 28 a chaos communication method based on one-way coupled map lattices ͑OCMLs͒. They claim that it has high security, fast encryption speed, and short synchronization transient.
This work proves that the scheme proposed in Ref. 28 has some security weaknesses. Indeed, we propose an attack for which the system cannot withstand.
Section II of this paper briefly presents the classical types of attacks. In Sec. III, we present the encryption schemes proposed in Ref. 28. Then, Sec. IV shows the drawbacks of the cryptosystem and how they can be exploited to maintain an attack. Section V describes the attack algorithm. Section VI draws some simulations results. Lastly, some conclusions are drawn in Sec. VII.
II. CLASSICAL TYPES OF ATTACKS
When cryptanalyzing a ciphering algorithm, the general assumption made is that the cryptanalyst knows exactly the design and working of the cryptosystem under study, i.e., he knows everything about the cryptosystem except the secret key. This is an evident requirement in today's secure communications networks, usually referred to as Kerchoffs' principle ͑Ref. 
